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Abstract—Deep learning has gained tremendous success and great popularity in the past few years. However, recent research found
that it is suffering several inherent weaknesses, which can threaten the security and privacy of the stackholders. Deep learning’s wide
use further magnifies the caused consequences. To this end, lots of research has been conducted with the purpose of exhaustively
identifying intrinsic weaknesses and subsequently proposing feasible mitigation. Yet few is clear about how these weaknesses are
incurred and how effective are these attack approaches in assaulting deep learning. In order to unveil the security weaknesses and aid
in the development of a robust deep learning system, we are devoted to undertaking a comprehensive investigation on attacks towards
deep learning, and extensively evaluating these attacks in multiple views. In particular, we focus on four types of attacks associated
with security and privacy of deep learning: model extraction attack, model inversion attack, poisoning attack and adversarial attack. For
each type of attack, we construct its essential workflow as well as adversary capabilities and attack goals. Many pivot metrics are
devised for evaluating the attack approaches, by which we perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis. From the analysis, we have
identified significant and indispensable factors in an attack vector, e.g., how to reduce queries to target models, what distance used for
measuring perturbation. We spot light on 17 findings covering these approaches’ merits and demerits, success probability, deployment
complexity and prospects. Moreover, we discuss other potential security weaknesses and possible mitigation which can inspire relevant
researchers in this area.
Index Terms—deep learning, poisoning attack, adversarial attack, model extraction attack, model inversion attack
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1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP learning has gained a tremendous success andbecomes the most significant driving force for artificial
intelligence (AI). It fuels multiple areas including image
classification, speech recognition, natural language process-
ing, and malware detection. Due to the great advances in
computing power and the dramatic increase in data volume,
deep learning has exhibited superior potential in these sce-
narios, comparing to traditional techniques. Deep learning
excels in feature learning, deepening the understanding
of one object, and unparalleled prediction ability. In im-
age recognition, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) can
classify different unknown images for us, and some even
perform better than humans. In natural language process-
ing, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) or long-short-term
memory networks (LSTMs) can help us translate and sum-
marize text information. Other fields including autonomous
driving, speech recognition, and malware detection all have
widespread application of deep learning. Internet of things
(IoT) and intelligent home system have also arisen in recent
years. As such, we are stepping into the era of intelligence.
However, deep learning-based intelligent systems
around us are suffering from a number of security prob-
lems. Machine learning models could be stolen through
APIs [160]. Intelligent voice systems may execute unex-
pected commands [182]. 3D-printing objects could fool real-
world image classifiers [20]. Moreover, to ensure safety, tech-
nologies such as autonomous driving need lots of security
testing before it can be widely used [157] [185]. In the past
few years, the security of deep learning has drawn the at-
tention of many relevant researchers and practitioners. They
are exploring and studying the potential attacks as well
as corresponding defense techniques against deep learning
systems. Szegedy et al. [154] pioneer in exploring the stabil-
ity of neural networks, and uncover their fragile properties
in front of imperceptible perturbations. Since then, adversar-
ial attack has swiftly grown into a buzzing term in both
artificial intelligence and security. Many efforts have been
dedicated to disclosing the vulnerabilities in varying deep
learning models (e.g., CNN [129] [114] [113], LSTM [54] [39]
[131], reinforcement learning (RL) [74], generative adver-
sarial network (GAN) [91] [138]), and meanwhile testing
the safety and robustness for deep learning systems [90]
[106] [124] [153] [62] [177]. On the other hand, the wide
commercial deployment of deep learning systems raises the
interest of proprietary asset protection such as the training
data [117] [134] [186] [11] and model parameters [84] [96]
[72] [88]. It has started a war where privacy hunters exert
corporate espionage to collect privacy from the rivals and
the corresponding defenders conduct extensive measures to
counteract the attacks.
Prior works have been conducted to survey security and
privacy issues in machine learning and deep learning [14]
[25] [129] [22]. They enumerate and analyze attacks as well
as defenses that are relevant to both training phase and
prediction phase. However, these works mainly evaluate
the attacks either in limited domains (e.g., computer vision)
or perspectives (e.g., adversarial attack). Few studies can
provide a systematical evaluation of these attacks in their
entire life cycles, which include the general workflow, ad-
versary model, and comprehensive comparisons between
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2Fig. 1: Publications of security and privacy in deep learning
different approaches. This knowledge can well demystify
how these attacks happen, what capabilities the attackers
possess, and both salient and tiny differences in attack ef-
fects. This motivates us to explore a variety of characteristics
for the attacks against deep learning. In particular, we aim to
dissect attacks in a stepwise manner (i.e., how the attacks are
carried on progressively), identify the diverse capabilities
of attackers, evaluate these attacks in terms of deliberate
metrics, and distill insights for future research. This study
is deemed to benefit the community threefold: 1) it presents
a fine-grained description of attack vectors for defenders
from which they can undertake cost-effective measures to
enhance the security of the target model. 2) the evaluation
on these attacks can unveil some significant properties such
as success rate, capabilities. 3) the insights concluded from
the survey can inspire researchers on new solutions.
Our Approach. To gain a comprehensive understanding of
privacy and security issues in deep learning, we conduct
extensive investigations on the relevant literature and sys-
tems. In total, 137 publications have been studied which
are spanning across four prevailing areas–image classifica-
tion, speech recognition, neural language processing and
malware detection. Since the all-encompassing survey is
nearly impossible, we instead select the more representative
research in the past five years. Overall, we summarize
these attacks into four classes: model extraction attack, model
inversion attack, data poisoning attack, and adversarial attack.
In particular, model extraction and inversion attacks are
targeting the privacy (cf. Section 4,5), and data poisoning
and adversarial attacks can influence prediction results by
either downgrading the formation of deep learning models
or creating imperceptible perturbations that can deceive the
model (cf. Section 6,7). Figure 1 shows the publications on
these attacks in the past five years. The number of related
publications is experiencing a drastic increase in the past
five years, where it gains 100% increase in 2017 and 61.5%
increase in 2018. Adversarial attack is obviously the most
intriguing research and occupies around 46% of researchers’
attention. It is also worth mentioning that there is an ever-
increasing interest in model inversion attack recently, which
is largely credited to the laborious processing of training
data (More discussions can be found in Section 8).
In this study, we first introduce the background of deep
learning, and summarize relevant risks and commercial
deep learning systems deployed in the cloud for public. For
each type of attacks, we systematically study its capabili-
ties, workflow and attack targets. More specifically, if one
attacker is confronting a commercial deep learning system,
what action it can perform in order to achieve the target.
How the system is subverted step by step in the investigated
approaches, and what influences the attack will make to
both users and the system owner. In addition, we develop
a number of metrics to evaluate these approaches such as
reducing query strategies, precision of recovered training data,
and distance with perturbed images. Based on a quantitative
and qualitative analysis, we conclude many insights cover-
ing the popularity of specific attack techniques, merits and
demerits of these approaches, future trend and so forth.
Takeaways. According to our investigation, we have drawn
a number of insightful findings for future research. In par-
ticular, we find that in a black-box setting, attackers have
to interact by querying certain inputs from target deep
learning systems. How to reduce the number of queries for
avoiding the awareness of security detectors is the signif-
icant consideration for attackers. But there is few research
on query reduction to date. It is doomed to be a crowded
research area in the near future considering commercial
deep learning systems have been equipped with more pro-
tection techniques for prohibitive queries (cf. Section 4).
Substitute model is commonly seen across different attacks
against deep learning systems, and becomes a prerequisite
for attacks. It behaves similarly with the target model, and
exhibits approximating properties. Due to the transferabil-
ity, the successful attacks against the substitute model are
likely effective in the target model. As a sequence, model
extraction, model inversion and adversarial attack can all
benefit from the substitute model. Additionally, it converts
the black-box problem to a white-box one, which lowers the
difficulties of attacks (cf. Section 4). Because of uncertainty
of training data, data synthesis is a common practice to
represent similar training data. Either generated by fol-
lowing the distribution or generative adversarial network,
synthesized data can provide sufficient samples for training
a substitute model (cf. Section 5). A more advanced way for
poisoning purpose is to implant a backdoor in data and then
attackers can manipulate the predictions results with crafted
input (cf. Section 6). However, this technique is still far away
from the mature and remains a promising area. Most of
adversarial attacks have put their main efforts on addressing
optimization objectives, i.e., maximizing prediction errors
but minimizing “distance” with the original input (cf. Sec-
tion 7). A few studies also explore their practicality and ef-
fectiveness in the physical space. In addition, the “distance”
with the original input are measured in varying fashions
and still need to be improved for better estimation and new
applications. Moreover, we have discussed more security
issues for modern deep learning systems in Section 8, such
as ethical considerations and system security. Challenges of
physical attacks are also presented in this paper. We have
investigated some works on deep learning defenses and
summarized them in terms of attacks.
Contribution. We make the following contributions.
• Systematic security analysis of deep learning. We sum-
3Fig. 2: Deep learning systems and the encountered attacks
marize 4 types of attacks. For each attack, we construct
their attack vectors and pivot properties, i.e., workflow,
adversary model and attack goal. This could ease the
understanding of how these attacks are executed and
facilitate the development of counter measures.
• Quantitative and qualitative analysis. We develop a
number of metrics that are pertinent to each type of
attacks, for a better assessment of different approaches.
These metrics also serve as highlights in the development
of attack approaches that facilitate more robust attacks.
• New findings. Based on the analysis, we have concluded
17 findings that span in the four attacks, and uncover
implicit properties for these attack methods. Beyond these
attacks, we have identified other related security problems
such as secure implementation, interpretability, discrimi-
nation and defense techniques, which are promising re-
search topics in future.
2 RELATED WORK
There is a line of works that survey and evaluate attacks
toward machine learning or deep learning.
Barreno et al. conduct a survey of machine learning
security and present a taxonomy of attacks against machine
learning systems [25]. They experiment on a popular statis-
tical spam filter to illustrate their effectiveness. Attacks are
dissected in terms of three dimensions, including workable
manners, influence to input and generality. Amodei et al.
[18] introduce five possible research problems related to ac-
cident risk and discuss probable approaches, with an exam-
ple of cleaning robot, according to how it works. Papernot et
al. [130] study the security and privacy of machine learning
systematically. They summarize some attack and defense
methods, and propose a threat model for machine learn-
ing. It introduces attack methods in training and inferring
process, black-box and white-box model. However, methods
they summarized in each attack are not comprehensive
enough. Besides, they don’t involve much about defenses
or the most widely used deep learning models.
Bae et al. [22] review the attack and defense methods
under security and privacy AI concept. They inspect eva-
sion and poisoning attacks, in black-box and white-box. In
TABLE 1: Notations used in this paper
Notation Explanation
D dataset
x = {x1, . . . , xn} inputs in D
y = {y1, . . . , yn} predicted labels of x
yt = {y1t , . . . , ynt } true labels of x
||x− y||2 the Euclidean distance for x and y
F model function
Z output of second-to-last layer
L loss function
w weights of parameters
b bias of parameters
λ hyperparameters
Lp distance measurement
δ perturbation to input x
addition, their study focuses on privacy with no mention of
other attack types.
Liu et al. [103] aim to provide a comprehensive liter-
ature review in two phases of machine learning, i.e., the
training phase and the testing/inferring phase. As for the
corresponding defenses, they sum up with four categories.
In addition, this survey focuses more on data distribution
drifting caused by adversarial samples and sensitive infor-
mation violation problems in statistical machine learning
algorithms.
Akhtar et al. [14] first conduct a comprehensive study
on adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer vision.
They summarize 12 attack methods for classification, and
study attacks on models or algorithms such as autoen-
coders, generative model, RNNs and so on. They also study
attacks in the real world and summarize defenses. However,
they only study the computer vision part of adversarial
attack.
3 OVERVIEW
3.1 Deep Learning System
Deep learning is inspired by biological nervous systems and
composed of thousands of neurons to transfer information.
Figure 2 demonstrates a classic deep learning model. Typi-
cally, it exhibits to the public an overall process including: 1)
Model Training, where it converts a large volume of data into
a data model, and 2) Model Prediction, where the model can
4be used for prediction as per input data. Prediction tasks are
widely used in different fields. For instance, image classifi-
cation, speech recognition, natural language processing and
malware detection are all pertinent applications for deep
learning.
To formalize the process of deep learning systems, we
present some notations in Table 1. Given a learning task, the
training data can be represented as x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ∈
D. Let F be the deep learning model and it computes the
corresponding outcomes y based on the given input x, i.e.,
y = F (x). yt is the true label of input x. Within the course
of model training, there is a loss function L to measure the
predication error between predicted result and true label,
and the training process intends to gain a minimal error
value via fine-tuning parameters. The loss function can be
computed as L = Σ16i6n||yit − yi||2. So the process of
model training can be formalized as [136]:
arg min
F
∑
16i6n
||yit − yi||2 (1)
3.2 Risks in Deep Learning
One deep learning system involves several pivotal assets
that are confidential and significant for the owner. As
per the phases in Figure 2, risks stem from three types
of concerned assets in deep learning systems: 1) training
dataset. 2) trained model including structure, algorithms
and parameters. 3) inputs and results of predictions.
1 Training dataset. High-quality training data is significant
and vital for a better performance of the deep learning
model. As a deep learning system has to absorb plenty
of data to form a qualified model, mislabelled or inferior
data can hinder this formation and affect the model’s qual-
ity. These kinds of data can be intentionally appended to
the benign by attackers, which is referred to as poisoning
attack (cf. Section 6). On the other hand, the collection of
training data takes lots of human resources and time costs.
Industry giants such as Google have far more data than
other companies. They are more inclined to share their state-
of-the-art algorithms [83] [46], but they barely share data.
Therefore, training data is crucial and considerably valuable
for a company, and its leakage means big loss of assets.
However, recent research found there is an inverse flow
from prediction results to training data [161]. It leads that
one attacker can infer out the confidential information in
training data, merely relying on authorized access to the
victim system. It is literally noted as model inversion attack
whose goal is to uncover the composition of the training
data or its specific properties (cf. Section 5).
2 Trained model. The trained model is a kind of data
model, which is an abstract representation of its training
data. Modern deep learning systems have to cope with
a large volume of data in the training phase, which has
a rigorous demand for high performance computing and
mass storage. Therefore, the trained model is regarded as the
core competitiveness for a deep learning system, endowed
with commercial value and creative achievements. Once it
is cloned, leaked or extracted, the interests of model owners
will be seriously damaged. More specifically, attackers have
started to steal model parameters [160], functionality [122]
or decision boundaries [128], which are collectively known
as model extraction attack (cf. Section 4).
3 Inputs and results of predictions. As for prediction data
and results, curious service providers may retain user’s
prediction data and results to extract sensitive information.
These data may also be attacked by miscreants who intend
to utilize these data to make their own profits. On the
other hand, attackers may submit carefully modified input
to fool models, which is dubbed adversarial example [154].
An adversarial example is crafted by inserting slight pertur-
bations into the original normal sample which are not easy
to perceive. This is recognized as adversarial attack or evasion
attack (cf. Section 7).
3.3 Commercial Off-The-Shelf
Machine learning as a Service (MLaaS) has gained the mo-
mentum in recent years [99], and lets its clients benefit from
machine learning without establishing their own predictive
models. To ease the usage, the MLaaS suppliers make a
number of APIs for clients to accomplish machine learning
tasks, e.g., classifying an image, recognizing a slice of audio
or identifying the intent of a passage. Certainly, these ser-
vices are the core competence which also charge clients for
their queries. Table 2 shows representative COTS as well
as their functionalities, outputs to the clients, and usage
charges. Taking Amazon Image Recognition for example, it
can recognize the person in a profile photo and tell his/her
gender, age range, emotions. Amazon charges this service
with 1,300 USD per one million queries.
3.4 Dataset
Here we present common datasets used in our paper. In im-
age field, there are MNIST [95], CIFAR-10 [93], ImageNet [2],
GTSRB [5], GSS [4], IJB-A [7] and so on. In text field, reviews
from IMDB [8] are usually used. In speech field, corpora
such as Mozilla Common Voice [10] are used. In malware
field, datasets include DREBIN [1], Microsoft Kaggle [9], and
millions of files or programs they found.
4 MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACK: YOUR MODEL IS
MINE
4.1 Introduction
Model extraction attack attempts to duplicate a machine
learning model through the provided APIs, without prior
knowledge of training data and algorithms [160]. To for-
malize, given a specifically selected input X , one attacker
queries the target model F and obtains the corresponding
prediction results Y . Then the attacker can infer or even
extract the entire in-use model F . With regard to an arti-
ficial neural network y = wx + b, model extraction attack
can somehow approximate the values of w and b. Model
extraction attacks cannot only destroy the confidentiality
of model, thus damaging the interests of its owners, but
also construct a near-equivalent white-box model for further
attacks such as adversarial attack [128].
Adversary Model. This attack is mostly carried out under
a black-box model and attackers only have access to pre-
diction APIs. Their capabilities are limited in three ways:
5TABLE 2: Commercial MLaaS systems and the provided functionalities, output for clients and charges per 1M queries
System Functionality Output Cost/M-times
Alibaba Image Recognition
Image marking label, confidence 2500 CNY
scene recognition label, confidence 1500 CNY
porn identification label, suggestion 1620 CNY
Amazon Image Recognition Object & Scene Recognition label, boundingbox, confidence 1300 USDface recognition AgeRange, boundingbox, emotions, eyeglasses, gender, pose, etc 1300 USD
Google Vision API label description description, score 1500 USD
Fig. 3: Workflow of model extraction attack
model knowledge, dataset access, and query frequency. In
particular, attackers have no idea about model architectures,
hyperparameters, training process of the victim’s model.
They cannot obtain natural data with the same distribution
of the target’s training data. In addition, attackers may be
blocked by the target if submitting queries too frequently.
Workflow. Figure 3 shows a typical workflow of this attack.
First, attackers submit inputs to the target model and get
prediction values. Then they use input-output pairs and
different approaches to extract the confidential data. More
specifically, confidential data includes parameters [160], hy-
perparameters [165], architectures [119], decision bound-
aries [128] [84], and functionality [122] [45] of the model.
4.2 Approaches
There are basically three types of approaches to extract
models:
• Equation Solving (ES). For a classification model com-
puting class probabilities as a continuous function, it can
be denoted as F (x) = σ(w · x + b) [160]. Hence, given
sufficient samples (x, F (x)), attackers can recover the
parameters (e.g., w, b) by solving the equation w · x+ b =
σ−1(F (x)).
• Training Metamodel (MM). Metamodel is a classifier
for classification models [119]. By querying a classifica-
tion model on the ouputs Y for certain inputs X , at-
tackers train a meta-model Fm, mapping Y to X , i.e.,
X = Fm(Y ). The trained model can further predict
model attributes from the query outputs Y .
• Training Substitute Model (SM). Substitute model is
a simulative model mimicing behaviors of the original
model. With sufficient querying inputs X and corre-
sponding outputs Y , attackers train the model F s where
Y = F s(X). As a result, the attributes of the substitute
model can be near-equivalent to those of the original.
Stealing different information corresponds to different
methods. In terms of time, equation solving is earlier than
training meta- and substitute model. It can restore precise
parameters but is only suitable for small scale models.
Due to the increase of model size, it is common to train a
substitute model to simulate the original model’s decision
boundaries or classification functionalities. However, pre-
cise parameters seem less important. Metamodel [119] is an
inverse training with substitute model, as it takes the query
outputs as input and predicts the query inputs as well as
model attributes. Besides, it can be also used to explore more
informative inputs that help infer more internal information
of model.
4.3 Extracted Information
4.3.1 Parameters & Hyperparameter
Parameters are weight values (w) of layer to layer, and bias
values (b) of each layer. Hyperparameters refer to param-
eters during training, including dropout rate, learning rate,
mini-batch size, parameters in objective functions to balance
loss function and regularization terms, and so on. In the
early work, Trame`r et al. [160] tried equation solving to
recover parameters in machine learning models, such as
logistic regression, SVM, and MLP. They built equations
about the model by querying APIs, and obtained parameters
by solving equations. However, it needs plenty of queries
and is not applicable to DNN. Wang et al. [165] tried to
steal hyperparameter-λ on the premise of known model
algorithm and training data. λ is used to balance loss
functions and regularization terms. They assumed that the
gradient of the objective function is ~0 and thus got many
linear equations through many queries. They estimated the
hyperparameters through linear least square method.
4.3.2 Architectures
Architectures include that how many layers in the model,
how many neurons in each layer, how are they connected,
what activation functions are used, and so on. Recent papers
usually train classifiers to predict attributes. Joon et al. [119]
trained Metamodel, a supervised classifier of classifiers,
to steal model attributes (architecture, operation time, and
training data size). They submitted query inputs via APIs,
and took corresponding outputs as inputs of metamodel,
then trained metamodel to predict model attributes as out-
puts.
4.3.3 Decision Boundaries
Decision boundaries are the classification boundary be-
tween any two classes. In [128] [84] [127], they steal decision
boundaries and generate transferable adversarial samples
to attack black model. Papernot et al. [128] used Jacobian-
based Dataset Augmentation (JbDA) to produce synthetic
6TABLE 3: Evaluation on model extraction attacks as per stolen information.
Information Paper Approach Reducing Query Recovery Rate (%) for ModelsSVM DT LR kNN CNN DNN
Parameter Tramer et al. [160] ES - 99 99 99 - - 99
Hyper-par Wang et al. [165] ES - 99 - 99 - - -
Arch. Joon et al. [119] MM KENNEN-IO - - - - - 88
Decision.
Papernot et al. [128] SM reservoir sampling [163] - - - - - 84
Papernot et al. [127] SM reservoir sampling [163] 83 61 89 85 - 89
PRADA [84] SM - - - - - - 67
Func. Silva et al. [45] SM - - - - - 98 -Orekondy et al. [122] SM random, adaptive sampling - - - - 98 -
samples, which moved to the nearest boundary between
current class and all other classes. This technology aims
not to maximize the accuracy of substitute models, but en-
sures that samples arrive at decision boundaries with small
queries. Juuti et al. [84] extended JbDA to Jb-topk, where
samples move to the nearest k boundaries between current
class and any other class. They produced transferable tar-
geted adversarial samples rather than untargeted [128]. In
terms of model knowledge, Papernot et al. [127] found that
model architecture knowledge was unnecessary because a
simple model could be extracted by more complex model,
such as DNN.
4.3.4 Functionalities
Similar functionalities refer to replicating the original model
as much as possible on classification results. The primary
goal is to construct a predictive model that have closest
input-output pairs with the original. In [122] [45], they try to
improve classification accuracy of substitute model. Silva et
al. [45] used problem domain dataset, non-problem domain
dataset, and their mixture to train a model respectively. They
found model trained with non-problem domain dataset also
did well in accuracy. Besides, Orekondy et al. [122] assumed
attackers had no semantic knowledge over model outputs.
They chose very large datasets and selected suitable samples
one by one to query the black-box model. Reinforcement
learning approach was introduced to improve query effi-
ciency and reduce query counts.
4.4 Analysis
Model extraction attack is an emerging field of attack. In
this study, we totally survey 8 related papers and clas-
sify them by target information as shown in Table 3. We
sort them by the stolen information and evaluate them on
multiple aspects including employed approaches, strategies
for reducing queries, recovery rate for applicable models.
Recovery rate means how many percent of information
can be stolen, and is computed by differing the inferred
data with that of the original model. However, the attacks
on boundary decision cannot be directly measured in this
way. Thus, we use the misclassification rate of generated
adversarial examples as an alternative, since it reveals the
similarity between the simulative model and the original
model to some extent. Based on the statistics, we draw the
following conclusions.
Finding 1. Training substitute model is by no doubt the dominant
method in model extraction attacks with manifold advantages.
Equation solving is deemed as an efficient way to recover
parameters [160] or hyperparameters [165] in linear algo-
rithms, since it has an upper bound for sufficient queries.
As claimed in [160], d-dimensional weights can be cracked
with only d + 1 queries. However, this approach is hardly
applicable to the non-linear deep learning algorithms. So
researchers turn to the compelling training-based approach.
For instance, [119] trains a classifier, dubbed as metamodel,
over the target model so as to predict architectural infor-
mation which is categorical or limited real values. This
approach cannot cope with complex model attributes such
as decision boundary and functionality. That drives the
prevalence of substitute model as it serves as an incarna-
tion of the target model which behaves quite similarly. As
such, the substitute model has approximated attributes and
prediction results. Additionally, it can be further used to
steal model’s training data [84] and generating adversarial
examples [127].
Finding 2. To learn a substitute model of deep learning models de-
mands more queries than to infer parameters or hyperparmaeters
in simple machine learning models.
To be specific, attackers requires thousands of queries
on machine learning models, but have to query over 11,000
queries for stealing parameters in a simple neural net-
work [160]. Deep learning models are more challenging
because they are highly nonlinear, non-convex, and maybe
over-fitting. Additionally, the parameters will be drastically
increased along with the increment of layers and neurons.
Finding 3. Reducing queries, which can save monetary costs for
a pay-per-query MLaaS commercial model and also be resistant
to attack detection, has become an intriguing research direction in
recent years.
The requirement of query reduction arises due to the
high expense of queries and query amount limitation. In our
investigated papers, [119] trains a metamodel–KENNEN-
IO for optimizing the query inputs. [128], leverage reservoir
sampling to select representative samples for querying, and
[122] proposes two sampling strategies, i.e., random and
adaptive to reduce queries. Moreover, active learning [97],
natural evolutionary strategies [78], optimization-based ap-
proaches [44] [140] have been adopted for query reduction.
Finding 4. Model extraction attack is evolving from a puzzle
solving game to a simulation game with cost-profit tradeoffs.
MLaaS magnates like Amazon and Google have a
tremendous scale of networks running behind services. To
7Fig. 4: Workflow of model inversion attack
infer how many layers or neurons in the neural networks
become impossible and unaffordably costly. Therefore, it
makes a remarkable dent in attackers’ interest of solving
model attributes. On the other hand, inferring decision
boundary and model functionality emerge as new circum-
vention. Treating the target model as a black box, attackers
observes the response by feeding it with crafted inputs,
and finally construct a close approximation. Although the
substitute model is likely simpler and underperforms in
some cases, its prediction capabilities still make consider-
able profits for attackers.
5 MODEL INVERSION ATTACK: YOUR MODEL RE-
VEALS YOUR INFORMATION
5.1 Introduction
In a typical model training process, lots of information
is extracted and abstracted from the training data to the
product model. However, there also exists one inverse in-
formation flow which allows attackers infer the training
data from the model since neural networks may remember
too much information of the training data [148]. Model
inversion attack is just to leverage this information flow
and restore the feed data or data properties such as faces
in face recognition systems through model prediction or its
confidence coefficient.
Additionally, model inversion attack can be further re-
fined into membership inference attack (MIA) and property
inference attack (PIA). In MIA, the attacker can determine
whether a specific record is included or not in the training
data. In PIA, the attacker can speculate whether there is a
certain statistical property in the training dataset.
Adversary Model. Model inversion attack can be executed
in both black-box or white-box settings. In a white-box
attack, the parameters and architecture of the target model
are known by attackers. Hence, they can easily obtain a sub-
stitute model that behaves similarly, even without querying
the model. In a black-box attack, attacker’s capabilities are
limited in model architectures, statistics and distribution
of training data and so on. Attackers cannot obtain com-
plete training set information. However, in either setting,
attackers can make queries with specific inputs and get
corresponding outputs as well as class probabilities and
confidence values.
Workflow. Figure 4 shows a workflow of model inversion
attack which is suitable for both MIA and PIA. Here we take
MIA as an example. MIA can be accomplished in varying
ways: by querying the target model to get input-output
pairs, attackers can merely exercise Step 4 with heuristic
methods to determine the membership of a record [143]
[104] [52] [69] [102] (Approach 1); Alternatively, attackers
can train an attack model for determination, which neces-
sitates an attack model training process (Step 3). Attack
model’s training data is obtained by query inputs and
response [137] [19] (Approach 2); Due to the limitation
of queries and model attributes, some studies introduce
shadow models to provide training data for the attack
model [147] [143], which necessitates shadow model train-
ing (Step 2). Moreover, data synthesis (Step 1) is proposed
to provide more training data for a sufficient training (Ap-
proach 3).
5.2 Membership Inference Attack
Truex et al. [161] presented a generally systematic formu-
lation of MIA. Given the instance x and black-box access
to the classification model Ft trained on the dataset D, can
an adversary infer whether the instance x is included in D
when training Ft with a high degree of confidence?
Most of MIAs proceed in accordance with the workflow
in Figure 4. More specifically, to infer whether one data
item or property exists in the training set, the attacker may
prepare the initial data and make transformations to the
data. Subsequently, it devises a number of principles for
determining the correction of its guessing. We details these
components as follows.
5.2.1 Data Synthesis
Initial data has to be collected as prerequisites for deter-
mining the membership. According to our investigation,
an approximated set of training data is desired to imply
membership. This set can be obtained either by:
• Generate samples manually. This method needs some prior
knowledge to generate data. For instance, Shokri [147]
produced datasets similar to the target training dataset
and used the same MLaaS to train several shadow models.
These datasets were produced by model-based synthe-
sis, statistics-based synthesis, noisy real data and other
methods. If the attacker has access to part of dataset.
Then he can generate noisy real data by flipping a few
randomly selected features on real data. These data make
up the noisy dataset. If the attacker has some statistical
information about dataset, such as marginal distributions
of different features. Then he can generate statistics-based
synthesis using this knowledge. If the attacker has no
knowledge above, he can also generate model-based syn-
thesis by searching for possible data records. The records
that search algorithm needs to find are correctly classified
by target model with high confidence.
In [143], they proposed a data transferring attack without
any query to target model. They chose different datasets
to train the shadow model. The shadow model was used
to capture membership status of data points in datasets.
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training records by training generated models such as
GAN. Generated samples are similar to that from the
target training dataset. Improving the similarity ratio will
make this method more useful.
Both [102] and [67] attacked generated models. Liu et
al. [102] presented a new white-box method for single
membership attacks and co-membership attacks. The ba-
sic idea was to train a generated model with the target
model, which took the output of the target model as input,
and took the similar input of the target model as output.
After training, the attack model could generate data that
is similar to the target training dataset. Considering about
the difficult implementation of CNN in [147], Hitaj et al.
[69] proposed a more general MIA method. They per-
formed a white-box attack in the scenario of collaborative
deep learning models. They constructed a generator for
target classification model, and used them to form a GAN.
After training, GAN could generate data similar to the
target training set. However, this method was limited in
that all samples belonging to the same classification need
to be visually similar, and it could not generate an actual
target training pattern or distinguish them under the same
class.
5.2.2 Shadow Model Training
Attackers have sometimes to transform the initial data for
further determination. In particular, shadow model is pro-
posed to imitate target model’s behavior by training on
a similar dataset [147]. The dataset takes records by data
synthesis as inputs, and their labels as outputs. Shadow
model is trained on such dataset. It can provide class prob-
ability vector and classification result of a record. Shokri
et al. [147] designed, implemented and evaluated the first
MIA attack method for a black-box model by API calls in
machine learning. They produced datasets similar to the
target training dataset and used the same MLaaS to train
several shadow models. These datasets were produced by
model-based synthesis, statistics-based synthesis, noisy real
data and other methods. Shadow models were used to
provide training set (class labels, prediction probabilities
and whether data record belongs to shadow training set) for
the attack model. Salem et al. [143] relaxed the constraints in
[147] (need to train shadow models on the same MLaaS, and
the same distribution between datasets of shadow models
and target model), and used only one shadow model with-
out the knowledge of target model structure and training
dataset distribution. Here, the shadow model just tried to
capture the membership status of records in a different
dataset.
5.2.3 Attack Model Training
The attack model is a binary classifier. Its input is the
class probabilities and label of the record to be judged, and
output is yes (means the record belongs to the dataset of
target model) or no. Training dataset is usually required
to train the attack model. The problem is that the output
label of whether a record belongs to the dataset of target
model cannot be obtained. So here attackers often generate
substituted dataset by data synthesis. The input of this
training is generated either by the shadow model [147]
[143] or the target model [137] [111]. The training process
is to select some records from both inside and outside the
substituted dataset, and obtain the class probability vector
through target model or shadow model. The vector and
the label of record are taken as input, and whether this
record belongs to substituted dataset is taken as output.
Then training and learning attack model.
5.2.4 Membership Determination
Given one input, this component is responsible for de-
termining whether the query input is a member of the
training set of the target system. To accomplish the goal,
the contemporary approaches can be categorized into three
classes:
• Attack model-based Method. In inference phase, attackers
first put record to be judged into the target model, and
get its class probability vector, then put the vector and
label of record into the attack model, and get the mem-
bership of this record. Pyrgelis et al. [137] implemented
MIA for aggregating location data. The main idea was to
use priori position information and attack through distin-
guishability game process with a distinguishing function.
They trained a classifier (attack model) as distinguishing
function to determine whether data is in target dataset.
• Heuristic Method. This method uses prediction probability,
instead of an attack model, to determine the membership.
Intuitively, the maximum value in class probabilities of
a record in the target dataset is usually greater than the
record not in it. But they require some preconditions
and auxiliary information to obtain reliable probability
vectors or binary results, which is a limitation to apply
to more general scenarios. How to lower attack cost
and reduce auxiliary information can be considered in
the future study. Fredrikson et al. [52] tried to construct
the probability of whether a certain data appears in the
target training dataset, according to the probability and
auxiliary information, such as error statistics or marginal
priors of training data. Then they searched for input data
which maximized the probability, and the obtained data
was similar to data in target training dataset. The third
attack method in Salem et al. [143] only required the
probability vector of outputs from the target model, and
used statistical measurement method to compare whether
the maximum classification probability exceeds a certain
value.
Long et al. [104] put forward Generalized MIA method,
which was easier to attack non-overfitted data, different
from [147]. They trained a number of reference models
similar to the target model, and chose vulnerable data
according to the output of reference models before Soft-
max, then compared outputs between the target model
and reference models to calculate the probability of data
belonging to target training dataset. Reference models
in this paper were used to mimic the target model, like
shadow models. But they did not need an attack model.
Hayes et al. [67] proposed a method of attacking generated
models. The idea was that attackers determined which
dataset from attackers belonged to target training set,
according to the probability vector output by classifier.
Higher probability was more likely from target training
set (they selected the upper n sizes). In white-box, the
9classifier was constructed by that of target model. In
black-box, they used obtained data by querying target
model to reproduce classifier with GAN.
5.3 Property Inference Attack
Property inference attack (PIA) mainly deduces properties
in the training dataset. For instance, how many people have
long hair or wear dresses in a generic gender classifier. Is
there enough women or minorities in dataset of common
classifiers. The approach is largely same to a membership
inference attack. In this section, we only remark main differ-
ences between model inversion attacks.
Data Synthesis. In PIA, training datasets are classified by
including or not including a specific attribute [19].
Shadow Model Training. In PIA, shadow models are
trained by training sets with or without a certain property. In
[19] [53], they used several training datasets with or without
a certain property, then built corresponding shadow models
to provide training data for meta-classifier.
Attack Model Training. Here, attack model is usually also
a binary classifier. Ateniese et al. [19] proposed a white-
box PIA method by training a meta-classifier. It took model
features as input, and output whether the corresponding
dataset contained a certain property. However, this ap-
proach did not work well on DNNs. To address this, Ganju
et al. [53] mainly studied how to extract feature values
of DNNs. The part of meta-classifier was similar to [19].
Melis et al. [111] trained a binary classifier to judge dataset
properties in collaborative learning, which took updated
gradient values as input. Here the model is continuously
updated, so attacker could analyze updated information at
each stage to infer properties.
5.4 Analysis
As shown in Table 4, we have totally surveyed 13
model/property inversion attack papers.
Finding 5. Shadow model has a number of advantages over other
methods in model inversion attack.
Shadow models (4/13) are used in both MIA (2/13) [147]
[143] and PIA (2/13) [19] [53]. It is superior than other
methods in manifolds: 1) requiring no addition auxiliary
information [52], which is underlied by the assumption that
a higher confidence of prediction indicates the presence of
data records of a higher probability. 2) providing true in-
formation as training dataset for attack model. For a model
F and its training dataset D, training attack model needs
information of label x, F (x), and whether x ∈ D. If using
a shadow model, shadow model F and its dataset D are
known. All information is from shadow model and corre-
sponding dataset. If using the target model, F is the target
model and D is the training dataset. However, attackers do
not know D. So information whether x ∈ D need to be
replaced by whether x ∈ D′, where D′ is similar to D.
Finding 6. Data synthesis is a common practice to conduct model
inversion attack, compared to direct querying.
Data synthesis could generate data similar to target
dataset conveniently [147] [52] [69] [102], without querying
too many times. The synthesized data, which could be gen-
erated either by the statistical distribution of known training
data, or a generative adversarial network, can effectively
sample the original data. Hence, it is employed to train
a shadow model, a substitute for the target. It avoids too
many queries to the target model and thereby lowers the
perception by security mechanisms.
Finding 7. MIA is essentially a process that explicitly expresses
the logical relations contained in the trained model.
This kind of attacks requires many datasets and much
time, but the obtained information is really limited (only 1
bit [19] [53]). So the development of model inversion attack
is to obtain more overall information. For example, what is
the relationship between different training datasets. What’s
more, another development is to increase the amount of the
obtained information, for example, how to get details in a
single record.
Finding 8. Research about membership inference (10/13) is more
than property inference (4/13).
This is because membership inference now has a more
general adaptation scenario, and it emerges earlier. Further-
more, MIA can get more information than PIA in one-time
attack (just like training an attack model). A trained attack
model can be applied to many records in MIA, but only a
few properties in PIA. In [19], attackers want to know if their
speech classifier was trained only with voices from people
who speak Indian English. In [53], they try to find if some
classifiers have enough women or minorities in training
dataset. In [33], they are interested in the global distribution
of skin color. In [111], they want to know the proportion
between black and asian people.
Finding 9. Studies about heuristic methods (6/13) and attack
model (7/13) nearly share on a fifty-fifty basis.
In heuristic methods, using probabilities is easy to im-
plement, but barely works (0.5 precision and 0.54 recall)
on MNIST dataset [143]. Obtaining similar datasets usu-
ally needs to train a generative model [67] [102] [69]. In
attack model methods, attackers need to train an attack
model [137] [19]. Shadow models [147] [143] [19] are pro-
posed to provide datasets for the attack model, but increase
training costs.
6 POISONING ATTACK: CREATE A BACKDOOR IN
YOUR MODEL
Poisoning attack seeks to downgrade deep learning sys-
tems’ predictions by polluting training data. Since it hap-
pens before the training phase, the caused contamination is
usually inextricable by tuning the involved parameters or
adopting alternative models.
6.1 Introduction
In the early age of machine learning, poisoning attack had
been proposed as a non-trivial threat to the mainstream
algorithms. For instance, Bayes classifiers [118], Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [28] [31] [174] [173] [34], Hierarchical
Clustering [29], Logistic Regression [110] are all suffering
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TABLE 4: Evaluation on model inversion attack. It presents how the “Workflow” proceeds for each work, and its “Goal”,
either mia or pia. We select one experimental “Dataset” in the works and the corresponding “Precision” achieved as well
as the target “Model”. “Knowledge” denotes the acquisitions of attackers to the model, and “Application” is the applicable
domain of the target model. “structured data” refers to any data in a fixed field within a record or file [27].
Paper Workflow Goal Precision Dataset Model Knowledge ApplicationStep 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Truex et al. [161] X X MIA 61.75% MNIST DT Black image
Fredrikson et al. [52] X MIA 38.8% GSS DT Black image
Pyrgelis et al. [137] X X MIA - TFL MLP Black structured data
Shokri et al. [147] X X X X MIA 51.7% MNIST DNN Black image
Hayes et al. [67] X X MIA 58% CIFAR-10 GAN Black image
Long et al. [104] X MIA 93.36% MNIST NN Black image
Melis et al. [111] X X MIA/PIA - FaceScrub DNN White image
Liu et al. [102] X X MIA - MNIST GAN White image
Salem et al. [143] X X X X MIA 75% MNIST CNN Black image
Ateniese et al. [19] X X X X PIA 95% - SVM White speech
Buolamwini et al. [33] X PIA 79.6% IJB-A DNN Black image
Ganju et al. [53] X X X X PIA 85% MNIST NN White image
Hitaj et al. [69] X X MIA - - CNN White image
Fig. 5: Workflow of poisoning attack
the degradation from data poisoning. Along with the broad
use of deep learning, attackers have moved their attention
to deep learning instead [79] [144] [152].
Adversary Model. Attackers can implement this attack with
full knowledge (white-box) and limited knowledge (black-
box). Knowledge mainly means the understanding of train-
ing process, including training algorithms, model architec-
tures, and so on. Capabilities of attackers refer to controlling
over the training dataset. In particular, it discriminates how
much new poisoned data attackers can insert, and whether
they can alter labels in the original dataset and so on.
Attack Goal. There are two main purposes for poisoning the
data. One intuitive goal is to destroy the model’s availability
by deviating its decision boundary. As a result, the poisoned
model could not well represent the correct data and prone
to making wrong predictions. This is likely caused by mis-
labeled data (cf. Section 6.2.1), whose labels are intentionally
tampered by attackers, e.g., one photo with a cat in it is
marked as dog. The other purpose is to create a backdoor in
the target model by inserting confused data (cf. Section 6.2.2).
The model may behave normally at most of the time,
but arouse wrong predictions with crafted data. With the
pre-implanted backdoor and trigger data, one attacker can
manipulate prediction results and launch further attacks.
Workflow. Figure 5 shows a common workflow of poison-
ing attack. Basically, this attack is accomplished by two
methods: mislabel original data, and craft confused data.
The poisoned data then enters into the original data and
subverts the training process, leading to greatly degraded
prediction capability or a backdoor implanted into the
model. More specifically, mislabeled data is yielded by
selecting certain records of interest and flipping their labels.
Confused data is crafted by embedding special features that
can be learnt by the model which are actually not the essence
of target objects. These special features can serve as a trigger,
incurring an wrong classification.
6.2 Poisoning Approach
6.2.1 Mislabeled Data
Learning model usually experiences training under labeled
data in advance. Attackers may get access to a dataset,
and change a correct label to wrong. Mislabeled data could
push decision boundary of classifier significantly to incor-
rect zones, thus reducing its classification accuracy. Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al. [115] undertook a poisoning attack towards
multi-class problem based on back-gradient optimization.
It calculated gradient by automatic differentiation and re-
versed the learning process to reduce attack complexity. This
attack is resultful for spam filtering, malware detection and
handwirtten digit recognition.
Xiao et al. [174] adjusted a training dataset to attack SVM
by flipping labels of records. They proposed an optimized
framework for finding the label flips which maximizes clas-
sification errors, and thus reducing the accuracy of classifier
successfully. Biggio et al. [29] used obfuscation attack to
maximally worsen clustering results, where they relied on
heuristic algorithms to find the optimal attack strategy.
Alfeld et al. [17] added optimal special records into training
dataset to drive predictions in a certain direction. They
presented a framework to encode an attacker’s desires and
constraints under linear autoregressive models. Jagielski et
al. [79] could manipulate datasets and algorithms to influ-
ence linear regression models. They also introduced a fast
11
TABLE 5: Evaluation on poisoning attack. The data denotes an attacker needs to contaminate how many percent of training
data “Poison Percent” and achieves how many “Success Rate” under specific “Dataset”. “Model” indicates the attacked
model. “Timeliness” denotes whether the poison attack is in an online or offline setting. “Damage” means how many
predictions can be impacted. Attackers may possess two different “Knowledge”, either black-box or white-box, and make
poisoned model predict as expected, i.e., “Targeted”, or not. “structured data” is the same as Table 4. “LR” is linear
regression. “OLR” is online logistic regression. “SLHC” is single-linkage hierarchical clustering.
Paper Success Rate Dataset Poison Percent Model Timeliness Damage Knowledge Targeted Application
Xiao et al. [172] 20% 11944 files 5% LASSO offline - Black No malware
Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [115] 25% MNIST 15% CNN offline 30% error Black No image, malware
Jagielski et al. [79] 75% Health care dataset 20% LASSO offline 75% error Black No structured data
Alfeld et al. [17] - - - LR offline - White Yes -
Shafahi et al. [144] 60% CIFAR-10 5% DNN offline 20% error White Yes image
Wang et al. [171] 90% MNIST 100% OLR online - White Both image
Biggio et al. [29] - MNIST 1% SLHC offline - White Yes image, malware
statistical attack which only required limited knowledge of
training process.
The major research focuses on an offline environment
where the classifier is trained on fixed inputs. However,
training often happens as data arrives sequentially in a
stream, i.e., in an online setting. Wang et al. [171] conducted
poisoning attacks for online learning. They formalized the
problem into semi-online and fully-online, with three attack
algorithms of incremental, interval and teach-and-reinforce.
6.2.2 Confused Data
Learning algorithms elicit representative features from a
large amount of information for learning and training. How-
ever, if attackers submit crafted data with special features,
the classifier may learn fooled features. For example, mark-
ing figures with number “6” as a turn left sign and putting
them into the dataset, then images with a bomb may be
identified as a turn-left sign, even if it is in fact a STOP sign.
Xiao et al. [172] directly investigated the robustness of
popular feature selection algorithms under poisoning at-
tack. They reduced LASSO to almost random choices of
feature sets by inserting less than 5% poisoned training
samples. Shafahi et al. [144] found a specific test instance to
control the behavior of classifier with backdoor, without any
access to data collection or labeling process. They proposed
a watermarking strategy and trained a classifier with multi-
ple poisoned instances. Low-opacity watermark of the target
instance is added to poisoned instances to allow overlap of
some indivisible features.
6.3 Analysis
We investigated 7 papers on poisoning attack in total and
evaluate them over 9 metrics in Table 5. Based on the
analysis, we conclude the following findings.
Finding 10. Most attacks (6/7) are under an offline setting, and
only one [171] implements an online attack via online gradient
descent.
In an offline setting, model owners collect the training
data from multiple sources and train the models for once.
Attackers have to contaminate the data before the training.
However, in an online setting, the trained model can be
updated periodically with newly coming training data. It
allows attackers to feed poisonous data into the models
gradually and get them compromised. That causes vary-
ing difficulties for a successful attack. In particular, online
attacks have to consider more factors such as the order of
fed data, the evasiveness of poisonous data. It implies that
more studies start with offline attacks. However, in reality,
more and more models are trained online. Due to the drive
of profits, it is expected that there are emerging more attacks
against online training in the near future.
Finding 11. A few (2/7) papers use confused data with the
purpose of implanting a backdoor into the model.
In terms of difficulty, making mistakes inadvertently or
imperceptibly is more difficult than making misclassifica-
tion publicly for a model. A backdoor is such an impercepti-
ble mistake. A model performs well under normal functions,
while it opens the door for attackers when they need it.
In [144], the attacker adds a low-transparency watermark
into samples to allow some indivisible features overlapping.
In the prediction phase, attacker can use this watermark to
open the backdoor, causing misclassification. In addition,
attackers may use curious characteristics to cheat model
because it just learns useless features [172].
Finding 12. Poisoning attacks essentially seek for a globally or
locally distributional disturbance over training data.
It is well-known that the performance of learning is
largely dependent on the quality of training data. Quality
data is commonly acknowledged as being comprehensive,
unbiased, and representative. In the process of data poison-
ing, wrongly labeled or biased data is deliberately crafted
and added into training data, degrading the overall quality.
7 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK: UTILIZE THE WEAK-
NESS OF YOUR MODEL
Similar to poisoning attack, adversarial attack also makes a
model classify a malicious sample wrongly. Their difference
is that poisoning attack inserts malicious samples into the
training data, directly contaminating model, while adver-
sarial attack leverages adversarial examples to exploit the
weaknesses of the model and gets a wrong prediction result.
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Fig. 6: Workflow of adversarial attack
7.1 Introduction
Adversarial attack adds unperceived perturbations to nor-
mal samples during the prediction process, and then pro-
duces adversarial examples (AEs). This is an exploratory
attack and violates the availability of a model. It can be
used in many fields, e.g., image, speech, text, and malware,
particularly widespread in image classification. They can
deceive the trained model but look nothing unusual to
humans. That is to say, AEs need to both fool the classifier
and be imperceptible to humans. For an image, the added
perturbation is usually tuned by minimizing the distance
between the original and adversarial examples. For a piece
of speech or text, the perturbation should not change the
original meaning or context. In the field of malware detec-
tion, AEs need avoid being detected by models. Adversarial
attack can be classified into the targeted attack and untar-
geted attack. The former requires adversarial examples to
be misclassified as a specific label, while the latter desires a
wrong prediction, no matter what it will be recognized as.
Workflow. Figure 6 depicts the general workflow for an
adversarial attack. In white-box setting, attackers could di-
rectly calculate gradients [58] [16] [47] or solve optimization
functions [38] [42] [68] to find perturbations on original
samples (Step 3). In black-box setting, attackers obtain in-
formation by querying the target model many times (Step
1). Then they could train a substitute model to perform a
white-box attack [127] [128] (Step 2.1), or estimate gradients
to search for AEs [77] (Step 2.2).
In addition to deceiving the classification model, AEs
should carry minimal perturbations that evade the aware-
ness of human. Generally, the distance between normal and
adversarial sample can be measured by Lp Distance (or
Minkowski Distance), e.g., L0, L1, L2 and L∞.
Lp(x, y) = (
n∑
i=1
|xi − yi|p) 1p
x = {x1, x2, ...,xn}, y = {y1, y2, ..., yn}
(2)
7.2 Approach
Since the main development of adversarial attack is in the
field of image classification [154] [58] [38], we will introduce
more related work on image using CNN, and supplement
research on other fields or other models at the end of this
section.
7.2.1 White-box attack in image classification
First, we define that F : Rn −→ {1 . . . k} is the classifier
of model to map image value vectors to a class label.
Z(·) is the output of second-to-last layer, usually indicates
class probability. Z(·)t is the probability of t-th class. Loss
function describes the loss of input and output. δ is the
perturbation. ‖δ‖p is the p-norm of δ. x = {x1, x2, ..., xn}
is the original sample, xi is the pixel or element in sample
where xi ∈ x, 1 6 i 6 n. xi is sample of the i-th iteration,
usually x0 = x.
The process of finding perturbations essentially needs to
solve the following optimization problems (the first equa-
tion is non-targeted attack, the second equation is targeted
attack, T is targeted class label):
arg min
δ
‖δ‖p , s.t. F (x+ δ) 6= F (x)
arg min
δ
‖δ‖p , s.t. F (x+ δ) = T
(3)
Methods of finding perturbations can be roughly di-
vided into calculating gradients and solving optimization
function. Szegedy et al. [154] first proposed an optimization
function to find AEs and solved it with L-BFGS. FGSM [58],
BIM [16], MI-FGSM [47] are a series of methods for find-
ing perturbations by directly calculating gradients. Deep-
fool [114] and NewtonFool [81] approximate the nearest
classification boundary by Taylor expansion. Instead of per-
turbing a whole image, JSMA [129] finds a few pixels to
perturb through calculating partial derivative. C&W [38],
EAD [42], OptMargin [68] are a series of methods to find
perturbations by optimizing the objective function.
L-BFGS attack. Szegedy et al. [154] tries to find δ that
satisfies F (x + δ) = l, so to minimize perturbation and
Loss function, using Box-constrained L-BFGS to solve this
constraint optimization problem. In Equation 4, c (> 0) is a
hyperparameter and obviously, Loss(x, F (x)) = 0.
min
δ
c ‖δ‖2 + Loss(x+ δ, l)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(4)
FGSM attack. Goodfellow et al. [58] attacked the classifier
based on the gradient of input. lx is the true label of x. The
direction of perturbation is determined by the computed
gradient using back-propagation. Each pixel goes ε size in
gradient direction.
δ = ε · sign(∇xLoss(x, lx)) (5)
BIM attack. BIM (or I-FGSM) [16] iteratively changes the
step for new inputs as Equation 6. lx is the true label of x,
Clipx,{x} function performs clipping on image per-pixel.
x0 = x
xi+1 = Clipx,{xi + α · sign(∇xLoss(xi, lx))} (6)
MI-FGSM attack. MI-FGSM [47] adds momentum based on
I-FGSM [16]. Momentum is used to escape from poor local
maximum and iterations are used to stabilize optimization.
In Equation 7 y is the target class to be misclassified as:
xi+1 = Clipx,{xi + α · gi+1‖gi+1‖2
}
gi+1 = µ · gi + ∇xLoss(xi, y)‖∇xLoss(xi, y)‖1
(7)
JSMA attack. JSMA [129] modifies a few pixels at every
iteration. In each iteration, shown in Equation 8, αpq repre-
sents the impact on target classification of pixels p, q, and
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βpq represents the impact on all other outputs. Larger value
in this map means greater possibility to fool the network.
They pick (p∗, q∗) to attack.
αpq =
∑
i∈{p,q}
∂Z(x)t
∂xi
βpq = (
∑
i∈{p,q}
∑
j
∂Z(x)j
∂xi
)− αpq
(8)
(p∗, q∗) = arg max
(p,q)
(−αpq · βpq) · (αpq > 0) · (βpq < 0)
NewtonFool attack. NewtonFool [81] uses softmax output
Z(x). In Equation 9, x0 is the original sample and l = F (x0).
δi = xi+1 − xi is the perturbation at iteration i. They tried
to find small δ so that Z(x0 + δ)l ≈ 0. Starting with x0, they
approximated Z(xi)l using a linear function step by step as
follows.
Z(xi+1)l ≈ Z(xi)l +∇Z(xi)l · (xi+1 − xi), i = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
(9)
C&W attack. C&W [38] tries to find small δ in L0, L2,
and L∞ norms. Different from L-BFGS, C&W optimizes
following goals,
min
δ
‖δ‖p + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(10)
c is a hyperparameter and f(·) is defined as:
f(x+ δ) = max(max{Z(x+ δ)i : i 6= t} − Z(x+ δ)t,−K)
(11)
f(·) is an artificially defined function, the above is just
one case. Here, f(·) 6 0 if and only if classification result
is adversarial targeted label t. K guarantees x + δ will be
classified as t with high confidence.
EAD attack. EAD [42] combines L1 and L2 penalty func-
tions. In Equation 12, f(x+ δ) is the same as C&W and t is
the targeted label. Obviously, C&W attack becomes a special
EAD case when β = 0 [42].
min
δ
c · f(x+ δ) + β ‖δ‖1 + ‖δ‖22
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(12)
OptMargin attack. OptMargin [68] is an extension of C&W
L2 attack by adding many objective functions around x. In
Equation 13, x0 is the original example. x = x0 + δ is adver-
sarial. y is the true label of x0. vi are perturbations applied
to x. OptMargin guarantees not only x fools network, but
also its neighbors x+ vi.
min
δ
‖δ‖22 + c · (f1(x) + · · ·+ fm(x))
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
fi(x) = max(Z(x+ vi)y −max{Z(x+ vi)j : j 6= y},−K)
(13)
UAP attack. UAP [113] is universal perturbations which
suit almost all samples of a certain dataset. In Equation 14,
µ is the dataset that contains all samples. P represents
probability, and generally 0 < ζ << 1. The purpose is to
seek δ which could fool F (·) on almost any sample from µ.
F (x+ δ) 6= F (x), for most x ∼ µ
s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ ξ
Px∼µ (F (x+ δ) 6= F (x)) ≥ 1− ζ
(14)
7.2.2 Black-box attack in image classification
Finding small perturbations often requires white-box mod-
els to calculate gradients. However, this method does not
work in a black-box setting due to some constraints in-
cluding gradients. Therefore, researchers propose several
methods to overcome these constraints.
Step 2.1. Training substitute model. As mentioned in
Section 4, stealing decision boundaries in model extraction
attack and training substitute model can facilitate black-box
adversarial attacks [128] [127] [84]. Papernot et al. [128] pro-
posed a method based on an alternative training algorithm
using synthetic data generation in black-box settings.
Training substitute model needs that AEs can transfer
from the substitute model to the target model. Gradient
Aligned Adversarial Subspace [159] estimated previously
unknown dimensions of the input space. They found that a
large part of the subspace is shared for two different models,
thus achieving transferability. Further, they determined suf-
ficient conditions for the transferability of model-agnostic
perturbations.
Step 2.2. Estimating gradients. This method needs many
queries to estimate gradients and then search for AEs.
Narodytska et al. [116] used a technique based on local
search to construct the numerical approximation of network
gradients, and then constructed perturbations in an image.
Moreover, Ilyas et al. [77] introduced a more rigorous and
practical black-box threat model. They applied a natural
evolution strategy to estimate gradients and perform black-
box attacks, using 2∼3 orders of magnitude less queries.
7.2.3 Attack in other fields
Except for the image classification, adversarial attacks are
also used in other fields, such as speech recognition [57]
[182], text processing [54], malware detection [75] [131] [133]
[92] and so on.
In the speech field, Yuan et al. [182] embedded voice com-
mands into songs, and thereby attacked speech recognition
systems, not being detected by humans. DeepSearch [39]
could convert any given waveform into any desired target
phrase through adding small perturbations on speech-to-
text neural networks.
In the text processing field, DeepWordBug [54] gener-
ated adversarial text sequences in black-box settings. They
adopted different score functions to better mutate words.
They minimized edit distance between the original and
modified texts, and reduced text classification accuracy from
90% to 30∼60%.
In the malware field, Rigaki et al. [138] used GANs to
avoid malware detection by modifying network behavior
to imitate traffic of legitimate applications. They can adjust
command and control channels to simulate Facebook chat
network traffic by modifying the source code of malware.
14
Hu et al. [70] [71] and Rosenberg et al. [141] proposed meth-
ods to generate adversarial malware examples in black-
box to attack detection models. Dujaili et al. [15] proposed
SLEIPNIR for adversarial attack on binary encoded malware
detection.
7.2.4 Attack against other models
There is furthermore research in addition to DNN, such
as generative model, reinforcement learning and some ma-
chine learning algorithms. Mei et al. [110] identified the
optimal training set attack for SVM, logistic regression, and
linear regression. They proved the optimal attack can be
described as a bilevel optimization problem, which can be
solved by gradient methods. Huang et al. [74] demonstrated
that adversarial attack policies are also effective in reinforce-
ment learning, such as A3C, TRPO, DQN. Kos et al. [91]
attempted to produce AEs using deep generative models
such as variational autoencoder. Their methods include a
classifier-based attack, and an attack on latent space.
7.3 Analysis
In Table 6, we have measured 33 papers on adversarial
attack in total, and identified the following interesting ob-
servations.
Finding 13. Only a few attacks could be implemented in the
physical world.
Real-world attacks are scarce in image field (2/20) ac-
cording to our research. AEs in the digital space may fail to
fool classifiers in the physical space because physical attacks
need to consider more environmental factors. For example,
when an adversarial image is snapshot by a camera, it
is affected by photographing viewpoints, environmental
lighting, and camera noise. So camera may not be able to
catch those tiny perturbations. There are also some studies
about physical world attack [16] [20]. These images usually
need larger and obvious changes.
Except for image classification, AEs in speech also need
to consider physical channel because of the noise. However,
this problem does not exist in text or malware field, so we
give them all “Yes” in “Real-world”.
Finding 14. A bit more works focus on untargeted attacks
(57.6%) which are easier to achieve but less severe than targeted
attacks.
Untargeted attacks aims at inducing wrong predictions,
and thus more flexible in finding perturbations which only
need smaller modifications. Therefore, it can achieve success
more easily. Targeted attacks have to make the model predict
what as expected. Therefore, much more perturbations need
to be created for accomplishing the target. However, they are
usually more harmful and practical in reality. For example,
attackers may disguise themselves as authenticated users
in a face recognition system, in order to gain the access to
privileged resources.
Finding 15. Philosophy of distance selection.
Distance metrics is an important factor to find mini-
mum perturbations, which mostly use L-distance currently.
In Table 6, 60.1% attacks use L2 distance, 36.4% use L∞
distance, 18.2% use L1 distance and 18.2% use L0 distance.
Considering image classification only, 70% attacks use L2
distance, 45% use L∞ distance, 10% use L1 distance and
20% use L0 distance.
L0 distance reflects the number of changed elements, but
it is unable to limit the variation of each element. It suits
the scenes that only care about the number of perturbation
pixels, but not variation size. L1 distance is the absolute
values summation of every element in perturbations, equiv-
alent to Manhattan distance in 2D space. It limits the sum
of all variations, but does not limit large perturbation of
individual elements. L∞ distance does not care about how
many elements have been changed, but only cares about
the maximum of perturbations, equivalent to Chebyshev
distance in 2D space. L2 distance is an Euclidean distance
that considers all pixel perturbation, which is a more bal-
anced and the most widespread metric. It takes into account
both the largest perturbation and the number of changed
elements.
Finding 16. Different positions should have different weights for
perturbation.
In the current measurement methods, the perturbations
of different elements are considered to have the same
weight. However, in face images, the same perturbations
applied on the important part of face such as nose, eyes
and mouth, will be easier to identify than that applied on
the background. Similarly, in audio analysis, perturbations
are difficult to be noticed in a chaotic scene, but are easily
perceived in a quiet scene. According to above analysis,
we can consider to adopt different weights on different
elements when measuring distance. The important part has
a larger weight, so it can only make smaller perturbations,
while the unimportant part has a smaller weight, which can
introduce larger perturbations.
Finding 17. More advanced measurements for human perception
are desired.
The original goal of AEs is to make the model classify
samples wrongly while make humans be unaware of the
differences. However, it is difficult to measure humans’ per-
ception of these perturbations. Intuitively, small Lp distance
implies a low probability of being detected by humans.
While recent work found that Lp distance is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for perceptual similarity [145]. That is,
perturbations with large Lp values may also look similar to
humans, such as overall translation and rotation of images,
and small Lp perturbations do not mean imperceptible.
Therefore, we should break the constraint of Lp distance.
How to search for AEs systematically without Lp limitation,
and how to propose new measurements that could be nec-
essary or sufficient for perceptual similarity, will be a trend
of adversarial attack in the near future.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize 7 observations according to
the survey as follows.
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TABLE 6: Evaluation on adversarial attacks. This table presents “Success Rate” of these attacks in specific “Dataset” with
varying target “System” and “Model”. “Distance” implies how these works measure the distance between samples. “Real-
world” is used to distinguish the works that are also suitable for physical adversarial attacks. “Knowledge” is valued either
black-box or white-box. “Iterative” illustrates whether the optimization steps are iterative. “Targeted” differs whether an
attack is a targeted attack or not. “Application” covers the practical areas.
Paper Success Rate Dataset System Distance Model Real-world Knowledge Iterative Targeted Application
L-BFGS [154] 20% MNIST FC10(1) L2 DNN No White Yes Yes image
FGSM [58] 54.6% MNIST a shallow softmax network L∞ DNN No White No No image
BIM [16] 24% ImageNet Inception v3 L∞ CNN Yes White Yes No image
MI-FGSM [47] 37.6% ImageNet Inception v3 L∞ CNN No White Yes Both image
JSMA [129] 97.05% MNIST LeNet L0 CNN No White Yes Yes image
C&W [38] 100% ImageNet Inception v3 L0, L2, L∞ CNN No White Yes Yes image
EAD [42] 100% ImageNet Inception v3 L1, L2, L∞ CNN No White Yes Yes image
OptMargin [68] 100% CIFAR-10 ResNet L0, L2, L∞ CNN No White Yes No image
Guo et al. [60] 95.5% ImageNet ResNet-50 L2 CNN No Both Yes No image
Deepfool [114] 68.7% ILSVRC2012 GoogLeNet L2 CNN No White Yes No image
NewtonFool [81] 81.63% GTSRB CNN(3Conv+1FC) L2 CNN No White Yes No image
UAP [113] 90.7% ILSVRC2012 VGG-16 L2, L∞ CNN No White Yes No image
UAN [66] 91.8% ImageNet ResNet-152 L2, L∞ CNN No White Yes Yes image
ATN [23] 89.2% MNIST CNN(3Conv+1FC) L2 CNN No White Yes Yes image
Athalye et al. [20] 83.4% 3D-printed turtle Inception-v3 L2 CNN Yes White No Yes image
Ilyas et al. [77] 99.2% ImageNet Inception-v3 - CNN No Black No Both image
Narodytska et al. [116] 97.51% CIFAR-10 VGG L0 CNN No Black No No image
Kos et al. [91] 76% MNIST VAE-GAN L2 GAN No White No Yes image
Mei et al. [110] - - - L2 SVM No Black Yes No image
Huang et al. [74] - - A3C,TRPO,DQN L1, L2, L∞ RL No Both No No image
Papernot et al. [131] 100% Reviews LSTM L2 RNN Yes White No No text
DeepWordBug [54] 51.80% IMDB Review LSTM L0 RNN Yes Black Yes Yes text
DeepSpeech [39] 100% Mozilla Common Voice LSTM L∞ RNN No White No Yes speech
Gong et al. [57] 72% IEMOCAP LSTM L2 RNN Yes White No No speech
CommanderSong [182] 96% Fisher ASplRE Chain Model L1 RNN Yes White No Yes speech
Rosenberg et al. [141] 99.99% 500000 files LSTM L2 RNN Yes Black Yes No malware
MtNet [75] 97% 4500000 files DNN(4 Hidden layers) L2 DNN Yes Black No No malware
SLEIPNIR [15] 99.7% 55000 PEs DNN L2, L∞ DNN Yes Black No No malware
Rigaki et al. [138] 63% - GAN L0 GAN Yes Black No No malware
Pascanu et al. [133] 69% DREBIN DNN L1 DNN Yes Black No No malware
Kreuk et al. [92] 88% Microsoft Kaggle 2015 CNN L2, L∞ CNN Yes White No Yes malware
Hu et al. [70] 90.05% 180 programs BiLTSM L1 RNN Yes Black Yes No malware
Hu et al. [71] 99.80% 180000 programs MalGAN L1 GAN Yes Black No No malware
8.1 Regulations on privacy protection
As shown in Section 4 and 5, both the enterprises and
users are suffering from the risk of privacy. In addition
to removing privacy in the data, governments and related
organizations can issue laws and regulations against privacy
violations in the course of data use and transmission. In
particular, it is recommended that: 1) introducing regulatory
authorities to monitor these deep learning systems and
strictly supervise the use of data. The involved systems are
only allowed to extract features and predict results within
the permitted range. The private information is forbidden
for being extracted and inferred without authorization. 2)
establishing and improving relevant laws and regulations
(e.g., GDPR [3]), for supervising the process of data collec-
tion, use, storage and deletion. 3) adding digital watermarks
into the data for leak source tracking [21]. The watermarks
helps to fast find out the rule breakers that are liable for
exposing privacy.
8.2 Secure implementation of deep learning systems
Most of the research on deep learning security is concentrat-
ing on the leak of private data and the correctness of classi-
fication. As a software system, deep learning can be easily
built on mature frameworks such as TensorFlow, Torch or
Caffe. The vulnerabilities residing in these frameworks can
make the constructed deep learning systems vulnerable to
other types of attacks. The work [175] enumerates the secu-
rity issues such as heap overflow, integer overflow and use after
free in these widespread frameworks. These vulnerabilities
can result in denial of service, control-flow hijacking or sys-
tem compromise. Moreover, deep learning systems often de-
pend on third-party libraries to provide auxiliary functions.
For instance, OpenCV is commonly used to process images,
and Sound eXchange (SoX) is oftentimes used for audios.
Once the vulnerabilities are exploited, the attacker can cause
more severe losses to deep learning systems. Therefore, the
security auditing of deep learning implementation deserves
more research attention and efforts in the further work.
On the other hand, there are emerging a large number of
research works that leverage deep learning to detect and ex-
ploit software vulnerabilities automatically [181] [178] [80]
[151]. It is believed that these techniques are also applicable
in deep learning systems. Even more, deep learning might
help uncover the interpretation and fix the classification
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vulnerabilities in future.
8.3 How far away from a complete black-box attack?
Black-box attacks are relatively more destructive as they
do not require much information about the target which
lowers the cost of attack. Many works are claiming they
are performing black-box attacks towards deep learning
systems [147] [143] [79]. But it is not clear that whether they
are feasible on a large number of models and systems, and
what is the gap between these works with the real world
attack.
According to the surveyed results, we find that many
black-box attacks still assume that some information is
accessible. For example, [160] has to know what exact model
is running as well as its model structure before successfully
stealing out the model parameters. [147] conducts a mem-
bership inference attack built on the fact that the statistics
of training data is publicly known and similar data with
the same distribution can be easily synthesized. However,
these conditions may be difficult to satisfy the real world,
and a complete black-box attack is rarely seen in the recent
research.
Another difficulty of a complete black-box attack stems
from the protection measures performed by deep learning
systems: 1) query limit. Commercial deep learning systems
usually set a limit for service requests that prevents sub-
stitute model training. In [84], PRADA can detect model
extraction attacks based on characteristic distribution of
queries. 2) uncharted defense deployment. Besides not fully tan-
gible model, a black-box attacker also cannot infer how the
defense is deployed and configured at the backend. These
defenses may block a malicious request [112] [107], create
misleading results [84] and dynamically change or enhance
their abilities [165] [160]. Due to the extreme imbalance
of knowledge between attackers and defenders, all of the
above measures can avoid black-box attacks efficiently and
effectively.
8.4 Relationship between interpretability and security
The development of interpretability can help us better un-
derstand the underlying principles of all these attacks. Since
the neural network was born, it has the problem of low
interpretability. A small change of model parameters may
affect the prediction results drastically. People also cannot
directly understand how neural network operates. Recently,
interpretability has become an urgent field in deep learning.
In May of 2018, GDPR is announced to protect the privacy
of personal data and it requires interpretability when using
AI algorithms [3]. How to deeply understand the neural
network itself, and explain how the output is affected by
the input are all problems that need to be solved urgently.
Interpretability mainly refers to the ability to explain the
logic behind every decision/judgment made by AI and how
to trust these decisions [162]. It mainly includes rationality,
traceability, and understandability [86]. Rationality means
being able to understand the reasoning behind each predic-
tion. Traceability refers to the ability to track predictive pro-
cesses, which can be derived from the logic of mathematical
algorithms [87] [169]. Understandability refers to a complete
understanding of the model on which decisions are based.
At present, some work is about security and robustness
proof, usually against adversarial attack [169]. Deeper work
requires to explain the reasons for prediction results, making
training and prediction processes are no longer in black-box.
Kantchelian et al. [86] suggested that system designers
need to broaden the classification goal into an explanatory
goal and deepen interaction with human operators to ad-
dress the challenge of adversarial drift. Reluplex [87] can
prove in which situations, small perturbations to inputs
cannot cause misclassification. The main idea is the lazy
handling of ReLU constraints. It temporarily ignores ReLU
constraints and tries to solve the linear part of problems.
As a development, Wang et al. [169] presented ReluVal
to do formal security analysis of neural networks using
symbolic intervals. They proposed a new direction for
formally checking security properties without Satisfiability
Modulo Theory. They leveraged symbolic interval algorithm
to compute rigorous bounds on DNN outputs through min-
imizing over-estimations. AI2 [55] attempts to do abstract
interpretation in AI systems, and tries to prove the secu-
rity and robustness of neural networks. They constructed
almost all perturbations, made them propagate automat-
ically, and captured the behavior of convolutional layers,
max pooling layers and fully connected layers. They also
solved the state space explosion problem. DeepStellar [48]
characterizes RNN internal behaviors by modeling a RNN
as an abstract state transition system. They design two trace
similarity metrics to analyze RNNs quantitatively and also
detect AEs with very small perturbations.
The interpretability cannot only bring security, but also
uncover the mystery of neural network and make us under-
stand its working mechanism easily. However, this is also
beneficial to attackers. They can exclude the range of input
proved secure, thus reducing the retrieval space and find-
ing AEs more efficiently. They can also construct targeted
attacks through an in-depth understanding on models. In
spite of this, this field should not be stagnant. Because a
black-box model does not guarantee security [148]. There-
fore, with the improvement of interpretability, deep learning
security may rise in a zigzag way.
The development of interpretability is also conductive to
solving the hysteresis of defensive methods. Since we have
not yet achieved a deep understanding of DNN (it is not
clear why a record is predicted to the result, and how dif-
ferent data affect model parameters), finding vulnerabilities
for attack is easier than preventing in advance. So there is a
certain lag in deep learning security. If we can understand
models thoroughly, it is believed that defense will precede
or synchronize with attack [87] [169] [55].
8.5 Discrimination in AI
AI system may seem rational, neutral and unbiased, but
actually, AI and algorithmic decisions can lead to unfair
and discrimination [30]. For example, amazon’s AI hiring
tool taught itself that male candidates were preferable [63].
There are also discrimination in crime prevention, online
shops [30], bank loan [6], and so on. There are two main
reasons causing AI discrimination [6]: 1) Imbalanced train-
ing data; 2)Training data reflects past discrimination.
In order to solve this problem and make AI system better
benefit humans, what we need to do is: 1) balancing dataset,
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by adding/removing data about under/over represented
subsets. 2) modifying data or trained model where training
data reflects past discrimination [6]; 3) importing testing
techniques to test the fairness of models, such as sym-
bolic execution and local interpretability [12]; 4) enacting
non-discrimination law, and data protection law, such as
GDPR [3].
8.6 Corresponding defense methods
There is a line of approaches for preventing the aforemen-
tioned attacks.
MEA defense. Blurring the prediction results is an effec-
tive way to prevent model stealing, for instance, rounding
parameters [165] [160], adding noise into class probabili-
ties [96] [84]. On the other hand, detecting and prevent
abnormal queries can also resolve MEA. Kesarwani et al. [88]
recorded all requests made by clients and calculated the
explored feature space to detect attack. PRADA [84] de-
tected attack based on sudden changes in the distribution
of samples submitted by a given customer.
MIA defense. To defend with model inversion attacks,
researchers propose the following approaches:
• Differential privacy (DP), which is a cryptographic scheme
designed to maximize the accuracy of data queries while
minimizing the opportunity to identify their records when
querying from a statistical database [50]. Individual fea-
tures are removed to preserve user privacy. It is first
proposed in [49] and prove to be effective in privacy
preservation in database. DP can be applied to prediction
outputs [41] [64] [166] [184] [76], loss function [89] [155],
and gradients [149] [26] [155] [11] [184] [187].
• Homomorphic encryption (HE), which is an encryption func-
tion and enables the following two operations are value-
equivalent [139]: exercising arithmetic operations⊕ on the
ring of plain text and encrypting the result, encrypting
operators first and then carry on the same arithmetic
operations, i.e., En(x)⊕En(y) = En(x+ y). In this way,
clients can encrypt their data and then send it to MLaaS.
The server returns encrypted predictions without learning
anything about the plain data. In the meantime, the clients
have no idea about the model attributes [56] [101] [85]
[82].
• Secure multi-party computation (SMC), stemming from
Yao’s Millionaires’ problem [180] and enabling a safe
calculation of contract functions without trusted third
parties. In the context of deep learning, it extends to that
multiple parties collectively train a model and preserve
their own data [164] [146] [134] [135]. As such, the training
data cannot be easily inferred by attackers residing at
either computing servers or the client side.
• Training reconstitution. Cao et al. [37] put forward machine
unlearning, which makes ML models completely forget a
piece of training data and recover the effects to models
and features. Ohrimenko et al. [120] proposed a data-
oblivious machine learning algorithm. Osia et al. [123]
broke down large, complex deep models to enable scal-
able and privacy-preserving analytics by removing sensi-
tive information with a feature extractor.
PA defense. Poisoning attack can be mitigated through two
aspect: protecting data, including avoiding data tampering,
denial and falsification, and detecting poisonous data [170]
[105] [65]. In particular, Olufowobi et al. [121] described the
context of creation or modification of data points to enhance
trustworthiness and dependability of the data. Chakarov
et al. [40] evaluated the effect of individual data points
on the performance of trained model. Baracaldo et al. [24]
used source information of training data points and the
transformation context to identify poisonous data; protecting
algorithm, which adjusts training algorithms, e.g., robust
PCA [35], robust linear regression [43] [100], and robust
logistic regression [51].
AA defense. As adversarial attack draws the major atten-
tion, defensive work is more comprehensive and ample ac-
cordingly. The mainstream defense approaches is as follows:
• Adversarial training. This method selects AEs as part of the
training dataset to make trained model learn characteris-
tics of AEs [73] [94]. Furthermore, Ensemble Adversarial
Training [158] contained each turbine input transferred
from other pre-trained models.
• Region-based method. Understanding properties of adver-
sarial regions and using more robust region-based clas-
sification could also defend adversarial attack. Cao et
al. [36] developed DNNs using region-based classification
instead of point-based. They predicted label through ran-
domly selecting several points from the hypercube cen-
tered at the testing sample. In [125], the classifier mapped
normal samples to the neighborhood of low-dimensional
manifolds in the final-layer hidden space. Local Intrinsic
Dimensionality [107] characterized dimensional proper-
ties of adversarial regions and evaluated the spatial fill
capability. Background Class [109] added a large and
diverse class of background images into datasets.
• Transformation. Transforming inputs can defend adversar-
ial attack to a large extent. Song et al. [150] found that AEs
mainly lay in the low probability regions of the training
regions. So they purified an AE by moving it back towards
the distribution adaptively. Guo et al. [61] explored model-
agnostic defenses on image-classification systems by im-
age transformations. Xie et al. [176] used randomization at
inference time, including random resizing and padding.
Tian et al. [156] considered that AEs are more sensitive to
certain image transformation operations, such as rotation
and shifting, than normal images. Wang et al. [168] [167]
thought AEs are more sensitive to random perturbations
than normal. Buckman et al. [32] used thermometer code
and one-hot code discretization to increase the robustness
of network to AEs.
• Gradient regularization/masking. This method hides gradi-
ents or reduces the sensitivity of models. Madry et al. [108]
realized it by optimizing a saddle point formulation,
which included solving an inner maximization solved and
an outer minimization. Ross et al. [142] trained differen-
tiable models that penalized the degree to infinitesimal
changes in inputs.
• Distillation. Papernot et al. [126] proposed Defensive Dis-
tillation, which could successfully mitigate AEs con-
structed by FGSM and JSMA. Papernot et al. [132] also
used the knowledge extracted in distillation to reduce the
magnitude of network gradient.
• Data preprocessing. Liang et al. [98] introduced scalar quan-
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tization and smooth spatial filtering to reduce the effect
of perturbations. Zantedeschi et al. [183] used bounded
ReLU activation function for hedging forward propaga-
tion of adversarial perturbation. Xu et al. [179] proposed
feature squeezing methods, including reducing the depth
of color bit on each pixel and spatial smoothing.
• Defense network. Some studies use networks to automati-
cally fight against AEs. Gu et al. [59] used deep contractive
network with contractive autoencoders and denoising
autoencoders, which can remove amounts of adversarial
noise. Akhtar et al. [13] proposed a perturbation rectifying
network as pre-input layers to defend against UAPs. Mag-
Net [112] used detector networks to detect AEs which are
far from the boundary of manifold, and used a reformer
to reform AEs which are close to the boundary.
8.7 Future direction of attack and defense
It is an endless war between attackers and defenders, and
neither of them can win an absolute victory. But both
sides can research new techniques and applications to gain
advantages. From the attacker’s point of view, one effective
way is to explore new attack surfaces, find out new attack
scenarios, seek for new attack purposes and broaden the
scope of attack effects. In particular, main attack surfaces on
deep learning systems include malformed operational in-
put, malformed training data and malformed models [175].
In adversary attack, Lp-distance is not an ideal mea-
surement. Some images with big perturbations are still
indistinguishable for humans. However, unlike Lp-distance,
there is no standard measure for large Lp perturbations.
This will be a hot point for adversarial learning in future.
In model extraction attack, stealing functionality of complex
models needs massive queries. How to come up with a
better method to reduce the number of queries in order of
magnitude will be the focus of this field.
The balance of attack cost and benefit is also an impor-
tant factor. Some attacks, even can achieve fruitful targets,
have to perform costly computation or resources [160]. For
example, in [147], the attacker has to train a number of
shadow models that simulate the target model, and then
undertake membership inference. They need 156 queries to
produce a data point on average.
Attack cost and attack benefit are a trade-off pro-
cess [110]. Generally, the cost of attack contains time, com-
putation resources, acquired knowledge, and monetary ex-
pense. The benefit from an attack include economic pay-
back, rivals’ failure and so forth. In this study, we will not
give a uniform formula to quantify the cost and benefit
as the importance of each element is varying in different
scenarios. Nevertheless, it is usually modeled as an opti-
mization problem where the cost is minimized while the
benefit is maximized, like a min-max game [117].
As for defenders, a combination of multiple defense
techniques is a good choice to reduce the risk of being at-
tacked. But the combination may incur additional overhead
on the system that should be solved in design. For example,
in [101] [85], they adopted a mixed protocol combining
HE and MPC, which improved performance but with high
bandwidth.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive and extensive
investigation on attacks towards deep learning systems. Dif-
ferent from other surveys, we dissect an attack in a system-
atical way, where interested readers can clearly understand
how these attacks happen step by step. We have compared
the investigated works on their attack vectors and proposed
a number of metrics to compare their performance. Based
on the comparison, we then proceed to distill a number of
insights, disclosing advantages and disadvantages of attack
methods, limitations and trends. The discussion covering
the difficulties of these attacks in the physical world, secu-
rity concerns in other aspects and potential mitigation for
these attacks provide a platform that future research can be
based.
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